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TRIANGULATING GOD: 
A KANTIAN REJOINDER TO PEROVICH 
Stephen Palmquist 
After describing the basic structure of Kant's System of Perspectives, I re-
spond to Anthony Perovich's claim that my interpretation misconstrues 
Kant's true intentions concerning religion. Perovich assumes that "perspec-
tives" require unsystematic "openness," accommodating numerous conflict-
ing ways of interpreting religious phenomena. Yet Kant has in mind a fixed 
relationship between three specific perspectives (or "standpoints"): the prac-
tical, theoretical and judicial. The first and third can be used to construct a 
theology even though the theoretical standpoint alone cannot. Perovich's 
suggested revision of Kant along these lines therefore turns out to reflect a 
position which a perspectival interpretation shows to be Kant's own. 
"I recommend ... that the Kantian, who believes that reason alone leads to 
practical analogues of so many Christian beliefs, employ these practical 
teachings along with the intuitions of the mystics as two points from which 
to 'triangulate' Christian doctrine.'" Anthony Perovich has recently offered 
these words as the key to a properly Christian response to Kant's philosophy 
of the Christian religion. They appear in the conclusion of his recent Faith 
and Philosophy article, written in reply to an earlier article2 in which I argued 
that the basic principles of Kant's Critical philosophy and of Kant's own 
application of it to religion and theology are thoroughly consistent with a 
Christian way of thinking, acting and being. Perovich begins his reply with 
a fairly accurate summary of my "perspectival" method of interpreting Kant 
(pp. 95-96). Unfortunately, when he describes my proposal as to how a per-
spectival interpretation of Kant can show the Christian philosopher a whole 
new way of responding to the Critical philosophy (pp. 96-99), Perovich fails 
to portray my position quite so astutely; as a result, he is easily able to unveil 
problems which appear to be "fatal" (p. 99) to my interpretation, supposedly 
rendering it "demonstrably wrong as an interpretation of Kant's views" (p. 
96). In this rejoinder I shall respond to such accusations by clarifying this 
aspect of my perspectival interpretation; in so doing, I will argue that the 
solution Perovich himself suggests as a "revision" of Kant (pp. 99f) is in fact 
Kant's own position. 
The general perspectival approach to interpreting Kant, which Perovich 
concedes "is undoubtedly correct" (p. 96), operates on three levels: (1) the 
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Perspective of Kant's three Critiques, taken together, can be distinguished 
from that of some of his other systematic writings, such as those applying 
the Critical propaedeutic to metaphysics proper;3 (2) the standpoint of each 
Critique can be distinguished from that of the other two; and (3) within each 
Critique, four distinct perspectives can be discerned. The first level includes 
the Perspectives (note the capital "P") of Experience, Logic, Transcendental 
(or Critical) philosophy and Metaphysics. The second level includes the theo-
retical, the practical and the judicial standpoints (corresponding, respectively, 
to Kant's three Critiques). And the third level includes the empirical, logical, 
transcendental and hypothetical perspectives.4 Perovich's comments all focus 
on the issue of the relation between the three standpoints in Kant's System, 
so I will limit my present comments in the same way, even though the full 
profundity of Kant's religious philosophy cannot be appreciated without see-
ing in it the role of the other two levels of perspectives as well. 
Perovich's biggest mistake is to assume that a perspectival interpretation 
implies that Kant was recommending an attitude of "openness and flexibility" 
which would be "accommodating" to a wide variety of perspectives which 
might come to a person's mind, so that "religious phenomena" would "admit 
of multiple interpretations" (p. 97). My view, on the contrary, is that, to call 
these "perspectives" does not mean they are arranged arbitrarily, or related 
in such a way that one is just as good as another, or can be replaced by another 
at will. Rather, Kant sees them as having a definite, "architectonic" order, 
determined by reason itself. Their perspectival character simply means that 
what is true or certain in one case might not be true or certain in another, so 
that one must be careful to discern the proper perspective before answering 
any philosophical question. And religion, like everything else to which Kant 
applies his Critical acumen, does have its proper perspective. 
Before explaining just what that proper perspective is for Kant, I must say 
a word about the development of my own interpretation. The article Perovich 
is criticizing was first written in 1985, when my own application of a per-
spectival interpretation of Kant to his views on theology and religion was 
still in its infancy. At that time I was by no means claiming to have demon-
strated that the views expressed in that article were accurate as interpretations 
of Kant. Rather, I saw the article as a kind of "manifesto": a public declaration 
of my intention to demonstrate the validity of a new way of interpreting the 
religious implications of Kant's philosophy. Although the full-fledged dem-
onstration is not yet complete even today, many of its key points have already 
appeared in print.s So I am now in a far better position to state clearly and 
precisely just what it is that a perspectival interpretation implies for the 
Kantian Christian. 
In my previous Faith and Philosophy article I did indeed give the impres-
sion that for Kant religion is properly interpreted from the practical stand-
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point, but that other standpoints are not ruled out in principle. My argument 
at that point was weak, if not non-existent-a fact which did not escape 
Perovich's notice. I would now like to explain more clearly the position I was 
working towards at that time. For Kant, religion is primarily an experience 
involving a complex combination of actions and thoughts. It is, as such, 
analogous to the experiences of judging natural objects to be beautiful, sub-
lime or objectively purposeful. The proper standpoint for understanding all 
such experiences, experiences in which something mysterious and "supersen-
sible" breaks through the barrier of the mechanistic world (i.e., the world of 
"empirical knowledge," as it appears from the theoretical standpoint of the 
first Critique), is the judicial standpoint. But a question arises whenever we 
adopt this standpoint: from which non-judicial standpoint can I best explain 
why this experience is so meaningful to me? Kant's answer to this is always 
the same, whether he is examining beauty, religion, natural organisms or any 
other deep human experience. His answer is that the practical standpoint 
always has "primacy" over the theoretical.6 In other words, the value of any 
human experience of meaning comes from its participation in practical rea-
son, since the limits of theoretical reason exclude the possibility of grasping 
transcendent reality from the latter standpoint. 
An important point to note here is that Kant's doctrine of the primacy of 
practical reason does not imply that the practical has primacy over the judicial 
as well as the theoretical standpoint. Rather, it means only that, whenever we 
compare the practical standpoint with the theoretical-such as we must when 
we wish to trace our judicial experiences back to some deeper, rational 
source-the practical is the standpoint which must be given the primary place 
in our interpretation of experience. That Kant actually regarded the judicial 
standpoint as having primacy over both the theoretical and the practical is 
evident in many respects, not the least of which is the fact that the name he 
chose for the three main books in his philosophical System, "Critique," is 
itself an explicitly judicial term.7 Unfortunately, perhaps because of the 
chronological order of Kant's three Critiques, scholars have had an almost 
irresistible temptation to see Kant's God through the spectacles of his notion 
that God is,for theoretical reason, no more than an idea. What so often goes 
unnoticed is that Kant wrote his three Critiques in the opposite order of their 
logical importance. For Kant's God is most emphatically the God of the third 
Critique, as informed by the God of the second. 
Kant's book on religion, Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, should 
be read not as an appendix to Kant's practical philosophy, but as a companion 
to the third Critique, for it follows the latter in adopting the judicial stand-
point, one of the purposes of which is to construct a bridge over the gap 
between the theoretical and the practical. This is the main point I was trying 
to get across when I previously stated that Kant's interest in religion extends 
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beyond the practical standpoint (see quote on p. 96). Kant's view is not that 
"any old standpoint" will do just as well, but that there is one correct way to 
understand religion, and that this requires an understanding of the proper 
relationship between all three standpoints as they operate in religion. Relig-
ion is first and foremost an experience of something which we recognize as 
"divine commands,"s just as a judgment of beauty is first and foremost an 
experience of something which we recognize as having "subjective finality."9 
Without such basic experiences, there would be no religion and no judgments 
of beauty. But the question then arises: how can we best explain what these 
divine commands actually are? Kant's answer is twofold: (1) because they 
are supersensible, we can safely understand them only insofar as they can be 
regarded as expressions of practical reason, because theoretical reason does 
not give us access to the supersensible; and (2) the best theoretical explana-
tion must therefore remain a matter of faith, not knowledge, and must be 
formulated in such a way as to be in the service of what we do know (viz., 
our duty), and not vice versa. 
Perovich is undoubtedly in the majority of scholarship when he declares 
that the "open mind" I attribute to Kant on matters of supersensible experi-
ence "is quite simply not displayed in the Critical writings" (p. 97). I would 
agree that, if all we had to work with were the three Critiques, Kant's open 
mind, as expressed in (2), would be virtually impossible to discern. But 
fortunately, we have much more to go by than just these three books. Many 
of Kant's other writings, such as his Religion and his Opus Postumum, to say 
nothing of the riches available in his letters and published lectures, reveal to 
us the man behind the Critiques in a way that provides us with quite a 
different view of what Kant was trying to accomplish. With this as a context, 
even the Critiques themselves can be seen to be extraordinarily open-minded 
(considering the intellectual milieu of Kant's day) with regard to the possi-
bility of the supernatural influencing the natural. This was precisely my point: 
that we must be careful not to let the apparent closedness of the Critiques 
blind us to the real openness Kant reveals elsewhere. to 
Moreover, the term "open-minded" here does not mean that Kant suc-
cumbed to the all-too-common view that "whatever you believe is true is true 
for you"; rather, it means that he recognized his own inability to condemn, 
from the theoretical standpoint as such, anyone who chooses to interpret their 
religious experiences in terms of a given set of theoretical dogmas. What he 
did feel free to condemn was the tendency of many religious people to 
emphasize a certain theoretical interpretation of their experience more than 
its practical implications for their moral life. So this whole issue has little, if 
anything, to do with Kant's recognition of the fact that the human mind is 
not capable of "intellectual intuition" (whereby an object is created in the 
very process of thinking it), as Perovich seems to think it does (pp. 97-98, 
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102). Rather, it has to do with what Kant does and does not claim to be able 
to deny to religious believers (who normally do not make the mistake of 
believing they can take God's place as Creator). 
As an example of Kant's supposedly exclusive (reductionist) emphasis on 
the practical standpoint in interpreting religion, Perovich refers to prayer. He 
claims that "what Palmquist understands by prayer" is "stated wishes directed 
toward God" (p. 97). Frankly, I am puzzled to read this, since it does not in 
fact represent my understanding of prayer, and since I never committed my-
self on this issue in the article in question. Since I hope to examine thoroughly 
at a later date the true depth of Kant's philosophy of prayer as an inner 
disposition of devotedness to obeying the Law God puts in our hearts, I will 
not defend my interpretation of Kant on this point in any detail here. Instead, 
I will merely comment that Kant never so much as hints that prayer is "only" 
or "nothing more than" the expression of such wishes (p. 97, Perovich's 
emphasis). These words, as is so often the habit of Kant's commentators, have 
been added by Perovich and attached to quotations in order to make Kant 
look like a reductionist. But no such language will be found in Kant's own 
writings, for he was no reductionistY Instead, the alert reader will always 
find a cautious form of expression which is based, more than anything else, 
on a Critical recognition of ignorance as to the ultimate nature of such 
experiences as prayer. What Kant does deny is that the mere repetition of 
words can have any value, practical or otherwise. By contrast, he affirms that 
real prayer can and does have value, and that this value goes far deeper than 
the mere repetition of words. Thus, whereas Kant does indeed believe that 
verbal prayer is optional, he would by no means agree that true prayer "falls 
away as a result of proper moral development" (p. 97). 
Perovich will never be able to find a text in which Kant explicitly denies 
that the believer is allowed to regard verbal prayer as a form of communica-
tion with God, because any such dogmatic denial would be repugnant to 
Kant's lifelong Critical disposition. Likewise, he will be unable to find a text 
in which Kant states that God is not to be regarded as a Trinity, because Kant 
believed, as shown in the passage quoted by Perovich himself (p. 98), that 
there are good practical reasons for viewing God in this way.12 That such 
denials, and innumerable others like them, can be found in the writings of 
Kant's commentators is unquestionable. Perovich, for example, seems to 
think that because Kant believes God's Triune nature is "theoretically unfa-
thomable," the theoretical standpoint is entirely useless to the theologian or 
religious believer. But if we put aside the reductionistic tradition of interpret-
ing Kant's religious views, and approach the text afresh (with a full recogni-
tion of the perspectival character of Kant's Critical way of thinking), the 
belief that Kant's hidden agenda is to do away with all theoretical theology 
will fall like scales from our mind's eye. Kant has nothing of the sort in mind. 
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Rather, his intention is to provide the practical ground for a proper way of 
thinking about God from a theoretical standpoint, by (1) denying that we can 
know about God from the theoretical standpoint, and (2) affirming that this 
standpoint, when directed towards the supersensible, can nevertheless be used 
to obtain hypotheses for rational belief, the value of which can then be 
confirmed or denied by practical reason. This interplay of denial and affirma-
tion is the source of the "openness" and "balance" which Perovich proclaims 
"are quite simply not there" in Kant's position (p. 98).13 
This means it is quite wrong to say that Kant believes "that numerous 
Christian doctrines are intelligible from the practical standpoint and from 
none other" (p. 103, note 9), even though Perovich believes Kant is "trans-
parent" in his support of such a position. What is the case is that Kant 
consistently and openly argues that, when comparing the theoretical and 
practical standpoints for their relative importance, we must always put the 
practical before the theoretical, as its ground, rather than vice versa. Hence, 
although it is incorrect to say that for Kant "[t]he moral perspective [=stand-
point] provides the only legitimate context for interpreting" Christian doc-
trines (p. 98), it would be correct to say this standpoint must be the rational 
ground for any such interpretation. The difference between true religion and 
false religion is not that one is practical and the other theoretical, but that 
one allows the practical to govern the theoretical, while the other requires 
the theoretical to govern the practical. Thus, in discussing the role of theo-
retical, "statutory laws" in religion, Kant does not categorically deny their 
validity, but requires that the "priority" be given to practical, moral laws: 
So much depends, when we wish to unite two good things, upon the order 
in which they are united! True enlightenment lies in this very distinction; 
therein the service of God becomes first and foremost a free and hence a 
moral service. 14 
This emphasis on the proper order in our combination of the practical and 
theoretical standpoints means that, for Kant, there is always a space left open 
for theoretical beliefs-beliefs which can never be fully justified by practical 
reason, but are acceptable because of their ability to strengthen our reliance 
on the latter (see above, note 13). 
Kant's "Critical theology," therefore, operates in precisely the way sug-
gested by Perovich's "revision" of Kant's position: "The Kantian need not 
abandon his commitment to practical foundations of religion, but he must 
supplement them if he would also be a Christian" (p. 101). I believe Kant 
himself supported exactly the same position in his own explanation of a 
healthy form of religious belief. 1s By using our religious experience and our 
practical reason as the two "known" points on the map of religion, we can, 
as it were, "triangulate" in order to find appropriate ways of thinking about 
the God who forever remains beyond the grasp of our theoretical knowledge. 
308 Faith and Philosophy 
If my interpretation is correct, then Perovich and Kant are in agreement that 
"triangulating" God is the best advice to offer to a philosophically-minded 
Christian. This requires us to see religion not merely as a set of theoretical 
dogmas to think about, nor merely as a set of practical rules to act upon, but 
as a set of experiences which show us the way to be. This does not mean that 
religious thoughts and actions are rendered superfluous: on the contrary, they 
are only in this way seen in their proper perspective. For only after we have 
rooted ourselves in such experiences (i.e., those which many philosophers, 
unlike Kant, have not been afraid to call "mystical" (see above, note 10)) can 
we then interpret these through the doctrine of the primacy of practical 
reason, and in so doing, use them to triangulate our way to an adequate 
theoretical (though hypothetical) understanding of the God within us. 
Hong Kong Baptist College 
NOTES 
1. Anthony N. Perovich, "Kant A Christian? A Reply to Palmquist," Faith and Philoso-
phy, volume 9, number 1 (January 1992), pp. 95-104. Subsequent references to this article 
will appear in the text as bracketed page numbers. 
2. Stephen Palmquist, "Immanuel Kant: A Christian Philosopher?", Faith and Philoso-
phy, volume 6, number 1 (January 1989), pp. 65-75. 
3. Kant distinguishes between metaphysics ("the inventory of all our possessions 
through pure reason, systematically arranged") and Critique (reason's own self-examina-
tion of its sources and limits) as early as the preface to the first edition of the first Critique. 
See Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith 
(London: Macmillan, 1929), pp. Axx-xxi. Page numbers refer to the original German 
versions, with "A" indicating material unique to the first edition. Page numbers for other 
references to Kant's writings always refer to the Berlin Academy edition of Kant's works, 
and are followed by the English pagination in brackets. 
4. For a more detailed explanation of these levels, see my book, Kant's System of 
Perspectives (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1993), especially Chapter 
II. 
5. These articles, which unfortunately have not appeared in their logical order, are as 
follows: "Kant's Critique of Mysticism: (1) The Critical Dreams," Philosophy & Theol-
ogy, volume 3, number 4 (Summer 1989), pp. 355-83 (published with several hundred 
gross editorial and typesetting errors, which render it virtually unintelligible in its uncor-
rected form); "Kant's Critique of Mysticism: (2) Critical Mysticism," Philosophy & 
Theology, volume 4, number 1 (Fall 1989), pp. 67-94; ''Four Perspectives on Moral Judgment: 
The Rational Principles of Jesus and Kant," The Heythrop Journal, volume 32, number 2 (April 
1991), pp. 216-32; "Kant's Theistic Solution to the Problem of Transcendental Theology," 
Rodica Croitoru (editor), Kant and the Transcendental Problem (Bucharest: University of 
Bucharest Faculty of Philosophy, 1991), pp. 148-78; "Kant's 'Appropriation' of Lampe's 
God," Harvard Theological Review, volume 85, number 1 (January 1992), pp. 85-108; 
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"Does Kant Reduce Religion to Morality?," Kant-Studien, volume 83, number 2 (1992), 
pp. 129-48; "Kant's Theocratic Metaphysics," Analele Universitatii Din Timisoara, vol-
ume 4 (1992), pp. 55-70; "The Kingdowm of God is at Hand!" (Did Kant Really Say 
That?)," History of Philosophy Quarterly, volume 11, number 4 (October 1994), pp. 
421-37. I am now working on a sequel to my book on Kant's Critical philosophy (see 
above, note 4), entitled Kant's Critical Religion, about half of which will consist of revised 
versions of the above articles. Originally, I had planned to include this material as Part 
Four (Chapters X-XII) of Kant's System of Perspectives (as stated in notes 26, 32 and 38 
of my previous Faith and Philosophy article (see above, note 2», but I have now decided 
to publish these as two separate monographs. 
6. See e.g., Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, translated by Lewis White 
Beck (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 119-21 (124-126). 
7. See Kant's System of Perspectives (op. cit.), pp. 355-56. 
8. See Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, translated by T. M. Greene and H. 
H. Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 153 (142). 
9. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, translated by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 188-92 (28-32). 
10. In the pair of articles on Kant's "Critical mysticism" cited above (see above, note 
5) I have demonstrated at length Kant's keen interest in mysticism, as well as explaining 
why most of Kant's remarks about mysticism were negative. The fact that Perovich's own 
"modifications" of Kant's position refer explicitly to mysticism (pp. 101-02) is therefore 
noteworthy. Provided that mystical experience is clearly distinguished from "intellectual 
intuition," and provided no claim is made to have thereby reached "empirical knowledge" 
of ultimate reality, I would heartily affirm Perovich's conviction "that nothing essential 
to Kantianism is sacrificed or rendered inconsequent by the recognition of mysticism as 
a legitimate cognitive mode" (p. 102). 
11. I argue this point in detail in my article, "Does Kant Reduce Religion to Morality?" 
(op. cit.). 
12. The text Perovich does quote, from Critique of Pure Reason (op. cit.), p. B270, does 
indeed contain some very strong words concerning the illegitimacy of claiming to have a 
supersensib1e experience of ghosts, clairvoyance or ESP. Yet Kant is here denying only 
that such experiences can ever obtain the status of empirical knowledge, not that they have 
no part in "human experience" in general, as Perovich assumes (p. 98). Moreover, Kant 
says nothing about whether or not Critical philosophy might provide some other way of 
thinking about such experiences. In other words, he is denying only that there will ever 
be a science of such experiences. 
Incidentally, Perovich himself refers to Kant's distinction between thinking and know-
ing, using it to suggest that we can never know anything about the supersensib1e (p. 101). 
If "knowledge" means only theoretical knowledge, then of course, this represents an 
accurate interpretation of Kant's position. But we must not forget that Kant not only 
believed in practical knowledge, but regarded it more highly than its theoretical counter-
part (something which some Christian philosophers and theologians unfortunately seem 
reluctant to do). Perovich underestimates just how much of Christian doctrine can be 
justified from the practical standpoint. 
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13. Perovich claims that "nothing beyond what our commitment to morality necessi-
tates" is justified by the practical standpoint (p. 99). In his Religion, however, Kant's actual 
position is that we are not required to think or act in any way other than that which our 
practical standpoint necessitates, but that we are justified in extending religion beyond 
morality as long as the non-moral (hence, non-necessary) elements serve to encourage the 
development of our moral standpoint. (I defend this point in detail in "Does Kant Reduce 
Religion To Morality?" (op. cit.), where I argue that morality is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient element in Kant's conception of true religion.) Hence, Perovich's charge that I 
"pretend ... that other perspectives ... are legitimate but underemphasized" (p. 100) is un-
fair; what I claim is that other standpoints are legitimized by the practical, and perhaps 
even complete the practical in some important ways, even though they can never be 
legitimate when used independently of their practical ground. 
14. Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (op. cit.), pp. 178-79 (166-67). 
15. The main difference between Perovich and myself, once the above clarifications of 
my position have been made, seems therefore to be a difference of opinion over just which 
reading of Kant it is that "conflicts with Kant's texts on every page" (pp. 98-99). And the 
only way to settle such a difference is to go into the details of the text itself. Although 
neither Perovich nor I went into sufficient detail in our Faith and Philosophy articles to 
demonstrate the validity of our opinions on this issue, I hope my subsequent efforts in 
this direction (see above, note 5) have provided at least a partial demonstration of my 
position-a position which I believe is fully consistent with all four of the "desiderata" 
which Perovich thinks must "be satisfied by any admissible supplement" to the position 
he believes Kant holds (p. 101). 
